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ABSTRACT
The Flash Crash, a brief period of extreme market volatility on May 6, 2010,
raised questions about the current structure of the U.S. ﬁnancial markets. We
use audit-trail data to describe the structure of the E-mini S&P 500 stock index
futures market on May 6. We ask three questions. How did High Frequency
Traders (HFTs) trade on May 6? What may have triggered the Flash Crash?
What role did HFTs play in the Flash Crash? We conclude that HFTs did not
trigger the Flash Crash, but their responses to the unusually large selling pressure
on that day exacerbated market volatility.
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On May 6, 2010, in the course of about 30 minutes, U.S. stock market indices,
stock-index futures, options, and exchange-traded funds experienced a sudden price
drop of more than ﬁve percent, followed by a rapid rebound. This brief period of
extreme intraday volatility, commonly referred to as the “Flash Crash”, raises a number
of questions about the structure and stability of U.S. ﬁnancial markets.
A survey conducted by Market Strategies International between June 23-29, 2010
reports that over 80 percent of U.S. retail advisors believe that “overreliance on computer
systems and high-frequency trading” were the primary contributors to the volatility
observed on May 6. Secondary contributors identiﬁed by the retail advisors include the
use of market and stop-loss orders, a decrease in market maker trading activity, and
order routing issues among securities exchanges.
Testifying at a hearing convened on August 11, 2010 by the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), rep-
resentatives of individual investors, asset management companies, and market interme-
diaries suggested that in the current electronic marketplace, such an event could easily
happen again.
In this paper, we describe trading in the bellwether E-mini Standard & Poor’s (S&P)
500 equity index futures market on the day of the Flash Crash. We use audit-trail,
transaction-level data for all regular transactions in the June 2010 E-mini S&P 500
futures contract (E-mini) during May 3-6, 2010 between 8:30 a.m. CT and 3:15 p.m.
CT. This contract is traded exclusively on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME)
Globex trading platform, a fully electronic limit order market. For each transaction, we
use data ﬁelds that allow us to identify the price, quantity and time of execution, the
account id of the buyer and seller, order id, order type (market or limit), as well as the
initiating side of the transaction (resting limit order or executable limit/market order).
Based on patterns of intraday volume, intraday inventory levels, and direction of
2trade, we classify each of more than 15,000 trading accounts that participated in trans-
actions on May 6 into one of six categories which we name: High Frequency Traders
(high volume and low inventory), Intermediaries (low inventory), Fundamental Buyers
(consistent intraday net buyers), Fundamental Sellers (consistent intraday net sellers),
Small Traders (low volume), Opportunistic Traders (all other traders not classiﬁed).
We investigate three questions. How did High Frequency Traders and other categories
trade on May 6? What may have triggered the Flash Crash? What role did the High
Frequency Traders play in the Flash Crash?
We ﬁnd that on May 6, the 16 trading accounts that we classify as HFTs traded over
1,455,000 contracts, accounting for almost a third of total trading volume on that day.
Yet, net holdings of HFTs ﬂuctuated around zero so rapidly that they rarely held more
than 3,000 contracts long or short on that day.
We also ﬁnd that HFTs did not change their trading behavior during the Flash
Crash. On the three days prior to May 6, and on May 6 itself—including speciﬁcally
the period where prices were rapidly going down, the HFTs seem to exhibit the same
trading patterns. Speciﬁcally, HFTs aggressively take liquidity from the market when
prices were about to change and actively keep inventories near a target inventory level.
During the Flash Crash, High Frequency Traders initially bought contracts from Fun-
damental Sellers. After several minutes, HFTs proceeded to sell contracts and compete
for liquidity with Fundamental Sellers. In this sense, the trading of HFTs, appears to
have exacerbated the downward move in prices. In addition, HFTs appeared to rapidly
buy and sell contracts from one another many times, generating a “hot potato” eﬀect
before Fundamental Buyers were attracted by the rapidly falling prices to step in and
take these contracts oﬀ the market.
Each transaction in the Globex system results from a match of a executable order
with a resting order. The CME audit-trail dataset explicitly labels the executable side
3of the transaction as aggressive and the non-executable side as passive. We ﬁnd that
approximately 46% of the volume High Frequency Traders trade is aggressively executed.
For each category of traders, we deﬁne the aggressiveness imbalance of each trader
category as the diﬀerence between the number of contracts aggressively bought and the
number of contracts aggressively sold. We ﬁnd that prices are more sensitive to the
aggressiveness imbalances of High Frequency Traders and Opportunistic Traders than
to the aggressiveness imbalances of Fundamental Buyers and Fundamental Sellers that
take liquidity from the market. This may be due to High Frequency Traders ability
to anticipate and react to price changes. Fundamental Traders do not have a large
perceived price impact given their aggressiveness imbalance, possibly due to their desire
to minimize their price impact and reduce transaction costs.
We ﬁnd evidence of a signiﬁcant increase in the number of contracts sold by Funda-
mental Sellers during the Flash Crash. Speciﬁcally, between 1:32 p.m. and 1:45 p.m.
CT—the 13-minute period when prices rapidly declined—Fundamental Sellers were net
sellers of more than 80,000 contracts while Fundamental Buyers were net buyers of only
about 50,000 contracts. This level of net selling by Fundamental Sellers is about 15 times
larger than their net selling over the same 13-minute interval on the previous three days,
while this level of net buying by the Fundamental Buyers is about 10 times larger than
their buying over the same time period on the previous three days.
In contrast, between 1:45 p.m. and 2:08 p.m. CT—the 23-minute period of the rapid
price rebound of the E-mini—Fundamental Sellers were net sellers of more than 110,000
contracts and Fundamental Buyers were net buyers of more than 110,000 contracts. This
level of net selling by Fundamental Sellers is about 10 times larger than their selling
during same 23-minute interval on the previous three days, while this level of buying
by the Fundamental Buyers is more than 12 times larger than their buying during the
same interval on the previous three days.
4The imbalance between Fundamental Buyers and Fundamental Buyers observed dur-
ing the Flash Crash was many times larger than the inventories of High Frequency
Traders. Opportunistic traders picked up the majority of the imbalance between Fun-
damental Buyers and Fundamental Sellers.
The CFTC-SEC May 6 report ﬁnds that the Flash Crash was triggered by a 75,000
contract sell program executed by a Fundamental Seller. Because net holdings of the
HFTs were so small (rarely greater than 3000 contracts) relative to the selling pressure
from the Fundamental Sellers on May 6, HFTs could have neither caused nor prevented
the fall in prices without dramatically altering their trading strategies.
Nearly 40 years before the Flash Crash, Black (1971) conjectured that irrespective
of the method of execution or technological advances in market structure, executions of
large orders would always exert an impact on price. Black also conjectured that liquid
markets exhibit price continuity only if trading is characterized by large volume coming
from small individual trades.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section I, we review the relevant literature. In
Section II, we summarize the public account of events on May 6, 2010. In Sections III
and IV, we describe the E-mini S&P 500 futures contract and provide a description of
the audit-trail, high frequency data we utilize. In Section V, we describe our trader clas-
siﬁcation methodology. In Section VI, we present our analysis of the trading strategies
of High Frequency Traders and Intermediaries. In Section VII, we describe the behavior
of Fundamental Buyers and Sellers. In Section VIII, we examine the activity of Oppor-
tunistic traders. In Section IX, we present the aggressivness imbalance regressions. In
Section X, we present our interpretation of the Flash Crash. Section XI concludes the
paper.
5I. Literature
Nearly 40 years ago, when exchanges ﬁrst contemplated switching to fully automated
trading platforms, Fischer Black surmised that regardless of market structure, liquid
markets exhibit price continuity only if trading is characterized by a large volume of
small individual trades. Black (1971) also stated that large order executions would
always exert an impact on price, irrespective of the method of execution or technological
advances in market structure.
At that time, stock market “specialists” were oﬃcially designated market makers,
obligated to maintain the order book and provide liquidity.1 In the trading pits of
the futures markets, many ﬂoor traders were unoﬃcial, but easily identiﬁable market
makers. Both the stock market specialists and futures market ﬂoor traders enjoyed a
proximity advantage compared to traders who participated away from the trading ﬂoor.
This advantage allowed specialists and ﬂoor traders to react more quickly to incoming
order ﬂow compared to other traders. Trading environments in which market makers
are distinct from other traders are examined in the theoretical models of Kyle (1985)
and Glosten and Milgrom (1985).
As markets became electronic, a rigid distinction between market makers and other
traders became obsolete. Securities exchanges increasingly adopted a limit order market
design, in which traders submit orders directly into the exchange’s electronic systems,
bypassing both designated and unoﬃcial market makers. In today’s electronic markets,
High Frequency Traders enjoy a latency advantage which allows them to react to changes
in order ﬂow more quickly than other traders. This occurred because of advances in
technology, as well as regulatory requirements. Theoretical models of limit order markets
include, among others, Parlour (1998), Foucault (1999), Biais, Martimor and Rochet
1Large orders were executed “upstairs” by block trading ﬁrms.
6(2000), Goettler, Parlour, and Rajan (2005, 2009), and Rosu (2009).
As more data became available, empirical research has conﬁrmed a number of empiri-
cal regularities related to such issues as multiple characterizations of prices, liquidity, and
order ﬂow. Madhavan (2000), Biais, Glosten and Spatt (2005), and Amihud, Mendelson
and Pedersen (2005) provide surveys of empirical market microstructure studies.
Most recently, Cespa and Foucault (2008) and Moallemi and Saglam (2010) propose
theoretical models of latency - an increasingly important dimension of electronic trading.
As low-latency, electronic limit order markets allowed for the proliferation of algorithmic
trading strategies, a number of research studies aimed to examine algorithmic trading.
Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2010) and Hendershott and Riordan (2009) examine
the impact of algorithmic traders in stock markets and ﬁnd their presence beneﬁcial.
Chaboud et al (2009) study algorithmic traders in foreign exchange markets and reach
similar conclusions. Hasbrouck and Saar (2010) and Brogaard (2010) examine certain
types of algorithmic traders and ﬁnd that they have a positive eﬀect on market quality.
Another strand of literature examines optimal execution of large orders — a par-
ticular form of algorithmic trading strategies designed to minimize price impact and
transaction costs. Studies on this issue include Bertsimas and Lo (1998), Almgren and
Chriss (1999,2000), Engle and Ferstenberg (2007), Almgren and Lorenz (2006), and
Schied and Schonenborn (2007).
Separately, Obizhaeva and Wang (2006) and Alfonsi and Schied (2008) study optimal
execution by modeling the underlying limit order book. Brunnermier and Pedersen
(2005), Carlin et al (2007), and Moallemi et al (2009) integrate the presence of an
arbitrageur who can “front-run” a trader’s execution. The majority of these studies ﬁnd
that it is optimal to split large orders into multiple executions to minimize price impact
and transaction costs.
The eﬀects of large trades on a market have also been thoroughly examined empiri-
7cally by a multitude of authors starting with Kraus and Stoll (1972) who utilized data
from the New York Stock Exchange.2 These studies generally ﬁnd that the execution of
large orders exerts both permanent and temporary price impact, while reducing market
liquidity.
II. Market Events on May 6, 2010: The Flash Crash
On May 6, 2010, major stock indices and stock index products rapidly dropped by more
than 5 percent and then quickly recovered. The extreme intraday volatility in stock
index prices is presented in Figure 1.
<Insert Figure 1>
Between 13:45 and 13:47 CT, the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA), S&P 500,
and NASDAQ 100 all reached their daily minima. During this same period, all 30 DJIA
components reached their intraday lows. The DJIA components dropped from -4% to
-36% from their opening levels. The DJIA reached its trough at 9,872.57, the S&P 500
at 1,065.79, and the NASDAQ 100 at 1,752.31. The E-mini S&P 500 index futures
contract bottomed at 1,056.00.3
During a 13 minute period, between 13:32:00 and 13:45:27 CT, the front-month June
2010 E-mini S&P 500 futures contract sold oﬀ from 1127.75 to 1,070.00 , (a decline of
57.75 points or 5.1%). At 13:45:27, sustained selling pressure sent the price of the E-
mini down to 1062.00. Over the course of the next second, a cascade of executed orders
caused the price of the E-mini to drop to 1056.00 or 1.3%. The next executed transaction
2See, among others, Holthausen et al (1987, 1990), Chan and Lakonishok (1993, 1995), Chiyachan-
tana et al (2004), Keim and Madhavan (1996, 1997), and Berkman (1996).
3For an in-depth review of the events of May 6, 2010, see the CFTC-SEC Staﬀ Report entitled
Preliminary Findings Regarding the Market Events of May 6, 2010.
8would have triggered a drop in price of 6.5 index points (or 26 ticks). This triggered the
CME Globex Stop Logic Functionality at 13:45:28. The Stop Logic Functionality pauses
executions of all transactions for 5 seconds, if the next transaction were to execute outside
the price range of 6 index points either up or down. During the 5-second pause, called
the “Reserve State,” the market remains open and orders can be submitted, modiﬁed
or cancelled, however, execution of pending orders are delayed until trading resumes.
At 13:45:33, the E-mini exited the Reserve State and the market resumed trading
at 1056.75. Prices ﬂuctuated for the next few seconds. At 13:45:38, price of the E-mini
began a rapid ascent, which, while occasionally interrupted, continued until 14:06:00
when the price reached 1123.75, equivalent to a 6.4% increase from that day’s low of
1056.00. At this point, the market was practically at the same price level where it was
at 13:32:00 when the rapid sell-oﬀ began.
Trading volume of the E-mini increased signiﬁcantly during the period of extreme
price volatility. Figure 2 presents trading volume and transaction prices on May 6, 2010
over 1 minute intervals.
<Insert Figure 2>
During the period of extreme market volatility, a large sell program was executed in
the June 2010 E-mini S&P 500 futures contract. “ At 2:32 p.m., against this backdrop
of unusually high volatility and thinning liquidity, a large fundamental trader (a mutual
fund complex) initiated a sell program to sell a total of 75,000 E-Mini contracts (val-
ued at approximately $4.1 billion) as a hedge to an existing equity position...This large
fundamental trader chose to execute this sell program via an automated execution algo-
rithm (Sell Algorithm) that was programmed to feed orders into the June 2010 E-Mini
market to target an execution rate set to 9% of the trading volume calculated over the
9previous minute...The execution of this sell program resulted in the largest net change in
daily position of any trader in the E-Mini since the beginning of the year (from January
1, 2010 through May 6, 2010). Only two single-day sell programs of equal or larger size
one of which was by the same large fundamental trader were executed in the E-Mini
in the 12 months prior to May 6. When executing the previous sell program, this large
fundamental trader utilized a combination of manual trading entered over the course of
a day and several automated execution algorithms which took into account price, time,
and volume. On that occasion it took more than 5 hours for this large trader to execute
the ﬁrst 75,000 contracts of a large sell program.” 4
III. CME’s E-mini S&P 500 Equity Index Contract
The CME S&P 500 E-mini futures contract was introduced on September 9, 1997. The
E-mini trades exclusively on the CME Globex trading platform in a fully electronic limit
order market. Trading takes place 24 hours a day with the exception of short technical
break periods. The notional value of one E-mini contract is $50 times the S&P 500 stock
index. The tick size for the E-mini is 0.25 index points or $12.50.
The number of outstanding E-mini contracts is created directly by buying and sell-
ing interests. There is no limit on how many contracts can be outstanding at any given
time. At any point in time, there are a number of outstanding E-mini contracts with
diﬀerent expiration dates. The E-mini expiration months are March, June, September,
and December. On any given day, the contract with the nearest expiration date is called
the front-month contract. The E-mini is cash-settled against the value of the underlying
index and the last trading day is the third Friday of the contract expiration month. Ini-
tial margin for speculators and hedgers(members) are $5,625 and $4,500, respectively.
4see Findings Regarding the Market Events of May 6, 2010
10Maintenance margins for both speculators and hedgers(members) are $4,500. Empiri-
cally, it has been documented that the E-mini futures contract contributes the most to
price discovery of the S&P 500 Index.5
The CME Globex matching algorithm for the E-mini oﬀers strict price and time
priority. Speciﬁcally, limit orders that oﬀer more favorable terms of trade (sells at lower
prices and buys at higher prices) are executed prior to pre-existing orders. Orders that
arrived earlier are executed before other orders at the same price. This market operates
under complete price transparency and anonymity. When a trader has his order ﬁlled,
the identity of his counterparty is not available.
IV. Data
We utilize audit trail, transaction-level data for all outright transactions in the June
2010 E-mini S&P 500 futures contract. These data come from the Computerized Trade
Reconstruction (CTR) dataset, which the CME provides to the CFTC. We examine
transactions occurring from May 3, 2010 through May 6, 2010, when the markets of the
underlying equities of the S&P 500 index are open and before the daily halt in trading,
i.e. weekdays between 8:30 a.m. CT and 3:15 p.m. CT. Price discovery typically occurs
in the front month contract; the June 2010 contract was the nearby, most actively traded
futures contract on May 6.
For each transaction, we use the following data ﬁelds: date, time (transactions are
recorded by the second), executing trading account, opposite account, buy or sell ﬂag,
price, quantity, order ID, order type (market or limit), and aggressiveness indicator
(indicates which trader initiated a transaction). These ﬁelds allow us to identify two
trading accounts for each transaction: a buyer and seller, identify which account ini-
5 See, Hasbrouck (2003).
11tiated a transaction, and whether the parties used market or limit orders to execute
the transaction. We can also group multiple executions into an order. Table I provides
summary of statistics for the June 2010 E-Mini S&P 500 futures contract during May
3-6, 2010.
<Insert Table I>
According to Table I, limit orders are the most popular tool for execution in this
market. In addition, according to Table I, trading volume on May 6 was signiﬁcantly
higher compared to the average daily trading volume during the previous three days.
V. Trader Categories
Financial markets are composed of traders that have diﬀerent holding horizons and
trading strategies. Some traders accumulate a position and hold it overnight. Other
traders will accumulate a position and oﬀset it within minutes. Yet another group of
traders establish and oﬀset a position within a matter of seconds.
Motivated by this and the absence of any designations in the E-mini market, we
designate individual trading accounts into six categories based on their trading activity.
Our classiﬁcation method, which is described in detail below, produces the following cat-
egories of traders: High Frequency Traders (16 accounts), Intermediaries (179 accounts),
Fundamental Buyers (1263), Fundamental Sellers (1276), Opportunistic Traders (5808)
and Small Traders (6880).
We deﬁne Intermediaries as short horizon investors who follow a strategy of buying
and selling a large number of contracts to stay around a relatively low target level of
inventory. Speciﬁcally, we designate a trading account as an Intermediary if its trading
12activity satisﬁes the following two criteria. First, the account’s net holdings ﬂuctuate
within 1.5% of its end of day level. Second, the account’s end of day net position is no
more than 5% of its daily trading volume. Together, these two criteria select accounts
whose trading strategy is to participate in a large number of transactions, but to rarely
accumulate a signiﬁcant net position.
We deﬁne High Frequency Traders as a subset of Intermediaries, who individually
participate in a very large number of transactions. Speciﬁcally, we order Intermedi-
aries by the number of transactions they participated in during a day (daily trading
frequency), and then designate accounts that rank in the top 7% as High Frequency
Traders. This cutoﬀ captures the signiﬁcant diﬀerence in magnitude of trading activ-
ity between High Frequency Traders and Intermediaries. Once we designate a trading
account as a HFT, we remove this account from the Intermediary category to prevent
double counting. 6
We deﬁne as Fundamental Traders trading accounts which mostly bought or sold
in the same direction during May 6. Speciﬁcally, to qualify as a Fundamental Trader,
a trading account’s end of day net position on May 6 must be no smaller than 15%
of its trading volume on that day. This criterion selects accounts that accumulate a
signiﬁcant net position by the end of May 6. Fundamental traders are further separated
into Fundamental Buyers and Sellers, depending on whether their end of day net position
is positive or negative, respectively. These traders appear to hold their positions for
longer periods of time.
We deﬁne Small Traders as trading accounts which traded no greater than 9 contracts
on May 6.
We classify the remaining trading accounts as Opportunistic Traders. Opportunistic
6To account for a possible change in trader behavior on May 6, we classify HFTs and Intermediaries
using trading data for May 3-5, 2010. We use data for May 6, 2010 to designate traders into other
trading categories.
13Traders may behave like Intermediaries (both buying and selling around a target net
position) and at other times may behave like Fundamental traders (accumulating a
directional long or short position).
Figure 3 illustrates the grouping of all trading accounts that transacted on May
6 into six categories of traders. The panels of Figure 3 presents individual trading
accounts trading volume (vertical axis) and net position scaled by market trading volume
(horizontal axis) for May 3-6.
<Insert Figure 3>
Figure 3 shows that diﬀerent categories of traders occupy quite distinct, albeit over-
lapping, positions in the “ecosystem” of a liquid, fully electronic market. HFTs, while
very small in number, account for signiﬁcant portion of trading volume. However, HFTs
do not accumulate a large net position. Intermediaries also do not accumulate a large
net position but trade much less volume than HFTs. Fundamental Traders accumulate
directional positions. Some Fundamental Traders acquire large positions by execut-
ing many small-size orders, while others execute fewer large-size orders. Fundamental
Traders which accumulate net positions by executing smaller orders may be disguising
their trading activity in order to avoid being taken advantage of by the market. Op-
portunistic Traders at times act like Intermediaries (buying a selling around a given
inventory target) and at other times act like Fundamental Traders (accumulating a di-
rectional position).
More formally, Table II presents descriptive statistics for these categories of traders
and the overall market during May 3-5, 2010 and on May 6, 2010.
<Insert Table II>
14In order to characterize market participation of diﬀerent categories of traders, we
compute their shares of total trading volume. Table II shows that HFTs account for
approximately 34% of total trading volume during May 3-5 and 29% of trading volume
on May 6. Intermediaries account for approximately 10.5 % of trading volume during
May 3-5 and 9% of trading volume on May 6. Trading volume of Fundamental Buyers
and Sellers accounts for about 12% of the total trading volume during May 3-5. On
May 6, Fundamental Buyers account for about 12% of total volume, while Fundamental
Sellers account for 10% of total volume. We interpret the composition of this market as
approximately 20% fundamental demand and 80% intermediation.
In order to further characterize whether categories of traders were primarily takers of
liquidity, we compute the ratio of transactions in which they removed liquidity from the
market as a share of their transactions.7 According to Table II, HFTs and Intermediaries
have aggressiveness ratios of 45.68% and 41.62%, respectively. In contrast, Fundamental
Buyers and Sellers have aggressiveness ratios of 64.09% and 61.13%, respectively.
This is consistent with a view that HFTs and Intermediaries generally provide liquid-
ity while Fundamental Traders generally take liquidity. The aggressiveness ratio of High
Frequency Traders, however, is higher than what a conventional deﬁnition of passive
liquidity provision would predict.8
In order to better characterize the liquidity provision/removal across trader cate-
7When any two orders in this market are matched, the CME Globex platform automatically classiﬁes
an order as ‘Aggressive’ when it is executed against a ‘Passive’ order that was resting in the limit order
book. From a liquidity standpoint, a passive order (either to buy or to sell) has provided visible liquidity
to the market and an aggressive order has taken liquidity from the market. Aggressiveness ratio is the
ratio of aggressive trade executions to total trade executions. In order to adjust for the trading activity
of diﬀerent categories of traders, the aggressiveness ratio is weighted either by the number of transactions
or trading volume.
8This ﬁnding is consistent with that of Menkveld et al (2009). One possible explanation for the order
aggressiveness ratios of HFTs is that some of them may actively engage in “sniping” orders resting in
the limit order book. Cvitanic and Kirilenko (2010) model this trading behavior and conclude that
under some conditions this trading strategy may have impact on prices. Similarly, Hasbrouck and Saar
(2009) provide empirical support for a possibility that some traders may have altered their strategies
by actively searching for liquidity rather than passively posting it.
15gories, we compute the proportion of each order that was executed aggressively.9 Ta-
ble III presents the distribution of ratios of order aggressiveness.
<Insert Table III>
According to Table III, the majority of High Frequency Traders’ executed orders are
entirely passive. Prior to May 6, about 79% of High Frequency Trader and Intermediary
orders are resting orders. Executable limit orders are approximately 18% of total HFT
orders and 20% of orders for Intermediaries.
As expected, Fundamental Traders utilize orders that consume more liquidity than
the orders of HFTs and Intermediaries. During May 3-5, executable orders comprise
46% of the Fundamental Buyers’ orders and 47% of the Fundamental Sellers’ orders. On
May 6, Fundamental Sellers use resting orders more often (59%) and executable orders
less often (40%), whereas Fundamental Buyers use executable orders more often (63%)
and resting orders less often (45%).
Moreover, during May 3-5, the average order size for both Fundamental Buyers and
Sellers is approximately the same - about 15 contracts, while on May 6, the average
executable order size of Fundamental Sellers (about 25 contracts) is more than 2.5 times
larger than the average executable order size of Fundamental Buyers (about 9 contracts).
For all trader categories, order size exhibits an inverse U-shaped aggressiveness pat-
tern: smaller orders tend to be either entirely aggressive or entirely passive. In contrast,
larger orders result in both passive and aggressive executions. The number of trades per
9The following example illustrates how we compute the proportion of each order that was executed
aggressively. Suppose that a trader submits an executable limit order to buy 10 contracts and this order
is immediately executed against a resting sell order of 8 contracts, while the remainder of the buy order
rests in the order book until it is executed against a new sell order of 2 contracts. This sequence of
executions yields an aggressiveness ratio of 80% for the buy order, 0% for the sell order of 8 contracts,
and 100% for the sell order of 2 contracts.
16order also follows a similar pattern with larger orders being ﬁlled by a greater number
of trade executions.
VI. High Frequency Traders and Intermediaries
Together HFTs and Intermediaries account for over 40% of the total trading volume.
Given that they account for such a signiﬁcant share of total trading, we ﬁnd it essential
to analyze their trading behavior.
A. HFTs and Intermediaries: Net Holdings
Figure 4 presents the net position holdings of High Frequency Traders during May 3-6,
2010.
<Insert Figure 4>
According to Figure 4, HFTs do not accumulate a signiﬁcant net position and their
position tends to quickly revert to a mean of about zero. The net position of the HFTs
ﬂuctuates between approximately 3000 contracts.
Figure 5 presents the net position of the Intermediaries during May 3-6, 2010.
<Insert Figure 5>
According to Figure 5, Intermediaries exhibit trading behavior similar to that of
HFTs. They also do not accumulate a signiﬁcant net position. Compared to the HFTs,
the net position of the Intermediaries ﬂuctuates within a more narrow band of 2000
contracts, and reverts to a lower target level of net holdings at a slower rate.
17On May 6, during the initial price decline, HFTs accumulated a net long position,
but quickly oﬀset their long inventory (by selling) before the price decline accelerated.
Intermediaries appear to accumulate a net long position during the initial decrease in
price, but unlike HFTs, Intermediaries did not oﬀset their position as quickly. The
decline in the net position of the Intermediaries occurred when the prices begin to
rebound.
B. HFTs and Intermediaries: Proﬁts and Losses
In addition, we calculate the proﬁts and losses of High Frequency Traders and Interme-
diaries on a transaction by transaction basis by employing the following formula.
PLy =
i ∑
t=0
[yt 1  ∆pt] (1)
Where yt 1 represents the net position of a trader at the time of market transaction
t and ∆pt represents the change in price since the last transaction in the market. This
measure is calculated from the ﬁrst transaction of our sample where t = 0 through
the last transaction, i. Our measure of proﬁtability makes the assumption that trading
accounts begin the day with no position. In addition, this measure is comprised of both
realized gains and unrealized gains.
Figure 6 shows the proﬁts and losses of High Frequency Traders on May 3-6.
<Insert Figure 6>
High Frequency Traders are consistently proﬁtable although they never accumulate
a large net position. This does not change on May 6 as they appear to have been even
more successful despite the market volatility observed on that day.
18Figure 7 shows the proﬁts and losses of Intermediaries on May 3-6.
<Insert Figure 7>
Intermediaries appear to be relatively less proﬁtable than HFTs. During the Flash
Crash, Intermediaries also appeared to have incurred signiﬁcant losses. This consistent
with the notion that the relatively slower Intermediaries were run over by the decrease
in price.
Overall, HFTs do not accumulate a signiﬁcant net position and their position tends
to quickly revert to a mean of about zero. Combined with their large share of total
trading volume (34%), HFTs seem to employ trading strategies to quickly trade through
a large number of contracts, without ever accumulating a signiﬁcant net position. These
strategies may be operating at such a high speed, that they do not seem to be aﬀected
by the price level or price volatility.
In contrast to HFTs, Intermediaries tend to revert to their target inventory levels
more slowly. Because of this, on May 6, Intermediaries may have gotten caught on the
wrong side of the market as they bought when prices rapidly fell.
C. HFTs and Intermediaries: Net Holdings and Prices
We formally examine the second-by-second trading behavior of HFTs and Intermediaries
by examining empirical regularities between their net holdings and prices. Equation 2
presents this in a regression framework.
∆yt = α + ϕ∆yt 1 + δyt 1 +
20 ∑
i=0
[βt i  ∆pt i/0.25] + ϵt (2)
where yt denotes portfolio holdings of HFTs or Intermediaries during second t, where
t = 0 corresponds to 8:30:00 CT. We utilize the price midpoint of an interval to calculate
19Price changes, ∆pt i, i = 0,...,20 are in ticks (0.25 index points) and the change in
inventories, ∆yt, is in the number contracts. We interpret δ and ϕ as long-term and
short-term mean reversion coeﬃcients.10
Table IV presents estimated coeﬃcients of the regression above. Panels A and B
report the results for May 3-5 and May 6, respectively. The t statistics are calculated
using the Newey-West (1987) estimator.
<Insert Table IV >
The ﬁrst column of Panel A presents regression results for HFTs during May 3-5.
The coeﬃcient estimate for the long-term mean reversion parameter is -0.005, and is
statistically signiﬁcant. This suggests that HFTs reduce 0.5% of their position in one
second. This long-term mean reversion coeﬃcient corresponds to an estimated half-life
of the inventory holding period of 137 seconds. In other words, holding prices constant,
HFTs reduce half of their net holdings in 137 seconds. This is signiﬁcantly smaller
than the specialist inventory half-life measures of Hendershott and Menkveld (2010)
who employ NYSE dataset from 1994-2005. This may be due to a dramatic increase in
speed of intermediation over the last few years. Another explanation may be that this
result is due to the fact that market makers are designated in equity markets and we
classify our traders with a speciﬁc set of criteria. 11
Changes in net holdings of HFTs are statistically signiﬁcantly positively related to
changes in prices for the contemporaneous price change and the ﬁrst 4 lags. The es-
timated coeﬃcients are positive, consistently decaying from the high of 32.089 for the
10Dickey-Fuller tests verify that HFT holdings level, Intermediary holdings level, as well as ﬁrst diﬀer-
ences are stationary. This is consistent with the intraday trading practices of HFTs and Intermediaries
to target inventory levels close to zero. Results are available upon request.
11We calculate the estimated half-life of the inventory holding period as
ln(0:5)
() .
20contemporaneous price to the low of 3.909 for the price 4 seconds prior. This can be
interpreted as follows: a one tick increase in current price corresponds to a increase of
about 32 contracts in the net holdings of HFTs. Moreover, a one tick increase in the
current price corresponds to an increase of up to 67 contracts during the next 4 seconds.
In contrast, estimated coeﬃcients for lagged prices 10 to 20 seconds prior to the
current holding period are negative and statistically signiﬁcant. These estimated coeﬃ-
cients fall within a much more narrow range of -2.208 and -5.860. This, in turn, means
that a one tick increase in price 10 to 20 seconds before corresponds to a maximum
cumulative decrease in net holdings of about 39 contracts.
We interpret these results as follows. HFTs appear to trade in the same direction
as the contemporaneous price and prices of the past four seconds. In other words, they
buy, if the immediate prices are rising. However, after about ten seconds, they appear
to reverse the direction of their trading - they sell, if the prices 10-20 seconds before
were rising.
These regression results suggest that, possibly due to their speed advantage or supe-
rior ability to predict price changes, HFTs are able to buy right as the prices are about
to increase.12 HFTs then turn around and begin selling 10 to 20 seconds after a price
increase.
The second column of Panel A presents regression results for the Intermediaries on
May 3-5. Similarly to HFTs, the long term mean reversion coeﬃcient for the Interme-
diaries is -0.004 and is statistically signiﬁcant. This suggests that the Intermediaries
reduce their net holdings by 0.4% after one second. The half-life of their inventory is
173 seconds.
In marked contrast to HFTs, coeﬃcient estimates for the contemporaneous price
12We also introduce lead price changes up to 10 seconds in this regression framework. Prior to May
6, lead price change coeﬃcients are positive and signiﬁcant up to three seconds for HFTs while they
are negative and signiﬁcant for Intermediaries. Results are available upon request.
21and the price one second before are negative (and signiﬁcant) at -13.540 and -1.218,
respectively. However, at prices 3 to 8 seconds prior, the estimated coeﬃcients are
positive and signiﬁcant.
These coeﬃcients could be interpreted as follows. The Intermediaries sell when the
immediate prices are rising, and buy if the prices 3-8 seconds before were rising. These
regression results suggest that, possibly due to their slower speed or inability to anticipate
possible changes in prices, Intermediaries buy when the prices are already falling and
sell when the prices are already rising.
Panel B presents the results of equation 2 on May 6. The ﬁrst column of Panel B
shows the results for HFTs. The coeﬃcient for the lagged change in holdings parameter
is positive but statistically insigniﬁcant at the 5% level. The coeﬃcients for contempo-
raneous and 1st lagged price changes are positive at 10.808 and 4.625, respectively.
This result may suggest that that on May 6, HFTs repeatedly reversed the direction
of their trading (e.g., become contrarian, switching from buying to selling, or otherwise)
signiﬁcantly sooner than during May 3-5.
The second column of Panel B reports the results for the change in holdings of
Intermediaries on May 6th. The contemporaneous price change estimate is -8.164. The
lagged price change coeﬃcients become positive for the next 3 lagged price changes,
decaying from 6.635 to 1.138.
We interpret the diﬀerence in results between these two samples to a change in
Intermediary behavior during the Flash Crash. This may be due to a reduction in
liquidity provision from this trader category during the Flash Crash.
22D. HFTs and Intermediaries: Liquidity Provision/Removal
We consider Intermediaries and HFTs to be very short term investors. They do not hold
positions over long periods of time and revert to their target inventory level quickly.
Observed trading activity of HFTs can be separated into three parts. First, HFTs seem
to anticipate price changes (in either direction) and trade aggressively to proﬁt from
it. Second, HFTs seem to submit resting orders in the direction of the anticipated
the price move. Third, HFTs trade to keep their inventories within a target level.
The inventory-management trading objective of HFTs may interact with their price-
anticipation objective. In other words, at times, inventory-management considerations
of HFTs may lead them to aggressively trade in the same direction as the prices are
moving, thus, taking liquidity. At other times, in order to revert to their target inventory
levels, HFTs may passively trade against price movements and, thus, provide liquidity.
In order to examine the liquidity providing and taking behavior of HFTs and Inter-
mediaries, we separate their changes in holdings into aggressive changes (those incurred
via aggressive acquisitions) and passive changes (those incurred via passive acquisitions).
Speciﬁcally, when traders submit marketable orders into the order book, they are con-
sidered to be aggressive. Conversely, the traders’ resting orders being executed by a
marketable order result in passive execution.
Table V presents the regression results of the two components of change in holdings
on lagged inventory, lagged change in holdings and lagged price changes over one second
intervals. Panel A and Panel B report the results for May 3-5 and May 6th, respectively.
<Insert Table V >
The dependent variable in the ﬁrst column of Panel A is the aggressive change in
holdings of HFTs on May 3-5. The short term and long term mean reversion coeﬃcients
23are statistically signiﬁcant, -0.042% and -.005%, respectively. In other words, HFTs
aggressively reduce 0.5% of their holdings in one second. The coeﬃcient estimates for
price changes are positive for the contemporaneous and ﬁrst 4 lagged prices, decaying
from 57.778 to 3.290. This can be interpreted as follows: a one tick increase in current
price corresponds to an aggressive increase of position of about 58 contracts by HFTs.
Moreover, a one tick increase in the current price corresponds to an increase of up to 99
contracts during the next 4 seconds.
The second column of Panel A presents the regression results for the passive change in
holdings of HFTs on May 3-5. The coeﬃcient for lagged change in holdings is 0.036 and
statistically signiﬁcant. The long term mean reversion estimate is -0.001, which is smaller
than the coeﬃcient from the aggressive holdings change regression. The coeﬃcient
estimates for the price changes are almost always negative. The contemporaneous and
ﬁrst lagged price changes are negative and statistically signiﬁcant; ranging from -25.689
for the contemporaneous price change to -5.371 for the 1st lagged price change.
Given the diﬀerence in magnitude between the aggressive and passive long term mean
reversion coeﬃcients, we interpret these results as follows, HFTs may be reducing their
positions and reacting to anticipated price changes by submitting marketable orders. In
addition, passive holdings changes of HFTs reﬂect liquidity provision.
The dependent variable in the third column of Panel A is the aggressive holdings
change of the Intermediaries on May 3-5. The coeﬃcients for lagged change in holdings
and lagged inventory level are 0.007 and -0.002, respectively. This result corresponds
to Intermediaries reducing 0.2% of their holdings aggressively in one second. The coef-
ﬁcients for the current and lagged price changes are positive; decreasing from 6.377 for
the current price change to 1.007 for the 10th lagged price change.
These estimates are smaller than the estimates for HFTs. Accordingly, we inter-
pret these results as evidence suggesting that Intermediaries are slower than HFTs in
24responding to anticipated price changes.13
The fourth column of Panel A presents the results for the passive position change
component of Intermediaries’ activity. The coeﬃcient estimates for lagged change in
holdings and lagged level of holding of Intermediaries are -0.013 and -0.002, respectively.
These coeﬃcients are similar to those we observe from the passive trading of Intermedi-
aries. The coeﬃcient estimates for price changes are statistically signiﬁcant and negative
through the 3rd lag. The coeﬃcients range from -19.917 for the current price change to
-1.117 for the 3rd lagged price change.
Our interpretation of these results suggests that given the similar passive and ag-
gressive mean reversion coeﬃcients, Intermediaries use primarily marketable orders to
move to their target inventory level. The passive holdings change for Intermediaries is
also contrarian to price ﬂuctuations, suggesting that the passive holdings change can be
a good proxy for the liquidity provision of Intermediaries.
In summary, the larger coeﬃcient for the Aggressive long term mean reversion param-
eter, suggests that HFTs very quickly reduce their inventories by submitting marketable
orders. They also aggressively trade when prices are about to change. Over slightly
longer time horizons, however, HFTs sometimes act as providers of liquidity.
The ﬁrst column of Panel B presents the results for aggressive holdings change of
HFTs on May 6th. Only the coeﬃcient on the current price change is positive and
statistically signiﬁcant; 23.703. The second column of Panel B shows the results for
passive holdings change of HFTs. The contemporaneous price coeﬃcient, -12.895, is
statistically signiﬁcant.
These results are qualitatively similar to those we observe on the 3 days prior to May
6. Therefore, we interpret these results as evidence that HFTs did not signiﬁcantly alter
13We also introduce lead price changes up to 10 seconds into this regression framework. Price change
coeﬃcients are positive and signiﬁcant for the aggressive trading of High Frequency Traders before May
6. Results are available upon request.
25their behavior during the Flash Crash. However, they may have executed their trading
strategies faster as price volatility increased.
The third column of Panel B presents the results for the aggressive positions change of
Intermediaries. The contemporaneous price change coeﬃcient is 4.939 and statistically
signiﬁcant. The fourth column in Panel B displays the results for passive holdings
change of Intermediaries. The contemporaneous price change coeﬃcient is -13.103 and
statistically signiﬁcant.
The coeﬃcients on price changes for the Intermediary passive holdings change re-
gression are smaller than those we observe prior to May 6th. We interpret this as a
possible decrease in liquidity provision by Intermediaries during the Flash Crash.
E. HFTs and Intermediaries: The Flash Crash
To examine these participants’ activity at an even higher resolution during the Flash
Crash. We employ equation 2 during the 36-minute period of the Flash Crash - starting
at 13:32 p.m. and ending at 14:08 p.m. CT. We partition this sample into two sub
samples, the price crash (DOWN, 13:32-13:45 p.m. CT) and recovery (UP, 13:45-14:08
CT), presented in Panels A and B, respectively of Table VI.
<Insert Table VI >
The ﬁrst column of Panel A presents the results for aggressive holdings change of
HFTs on May 6 during the rapid price decline. The long term mean reversion coeﬃcient
is -0.008 and statistically insigniﬁcant. The contemporaneous price change coeﬃcient is
positive and statistically signiﬁcant at 24.226.
The second column of Panel A presents passive change in holding of HFTs during
the price decline. The long term mean reversion coeﬃcient is positive but statistically
26insigniﬁcant. The contemporaneous price coeﬃcient is 8.533 and statistically signiﬁcant.
We interpret these results as follows: As the price of the E-mini contract declined,
High Frequency Traders were the counterparties to Opportunistic Traders’ aggressive
buying. However, the aggressive buying of Opportunistic Traders did not aﬀect the
direction of the price move. In addition, HFTs did not alter their behavior signiﬁcantly
when prices were rapidly going down. The shorter duration of statistical signiﬁcance on
price change coeﬃcients may be a function of the price volatility observed during the
Flash Crash.
The third column of Panel A presents the results for Intermediaries’ aggressive po-
sition change on May 6th during as the price of the E-mini decreased rapidly. Price
change coeﬃcients are positive and statistically signiﬁcant through the 2nd lag, ranging
from 8.251 to 4.257.
The fourth column of Panel A presents the results for the passive position changes of
Intermediaries during the decrease in price. The long term mean reversion coeﬃcient is
-0.012 and statistically signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcient for the contemporaneous price change
is -9.603 and statistically signiﬁcant.
These ﬁndings are not much diﬀerent from those we obtain in previous regressions.
Accordingly we interpret these results as evidence that Intermediaries did not seem to
alter their trading strategies signiﬁcantly as the price of the E-mini contract declined.
The dependent variable in the ﬁrst column of Panel B is HFTs aggressive position
change while the prices are rapidly going up. The long term mean reversion coeﬃcient is
-0.005 and statistically signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcient for the contemporaneous price change
is -0.251 and statistically insigniﬁcant. These results are quantitatively diﬀerent than
those we observe in previous regressions.
We interpret this lack of statistical signiﬁcance in the relationship between HFT
aggressive net position changes and prices as being related to the increase in market
27volatility and the inﬂux of Fundamental Buyers who bought as the price of the E-mini
contract recovered after the trading pause.
The results in the second column of Panel B present the relation between prices
and passive net position changes of HFTs when the prices were on their way up. The
long term mean reversion coeﬃcient is again insigniﬁcant. The statistically signiﬁcant
contemporaneous price change coeﬃcient, -9.107, is similar to past regressions of passive
holdings changes but diﬀers from the result of 8.533 during the price decline.
We interpret these results as a continuation in liquidity provisions by HFTs as the
price of the E-mini contract recovered to levels observed before the Flash Crash.
The third column of Panel B presents the regression results for the aggressive posi-
tion change of Intermediaries. The long term mean reversion coeﬃcient is -0.004 and
is statistically signiﬁcant. Coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant and positive for the
contemporaneous and ﬁrst lagged price change at 2.912 and 2.150, respectively. This
is smaller than the same coeﬃcient during the regression of Intermediary aggressive
holdings changes during the crash.
The fourth column of Panel B lists the regression results where the passive position
changes of Intermediaries during the price recovery of the E-mini contract. Although the
contemporaneous price coeﬃcient is negative and statistically signiﬁcant, the magnitude
of this coeﬃcient, -4.105, is considerably smaller the coeﬃcient observed in the fourth
column of Panel A.
We attribute this decrease in magnitude of contemporaneous price change to a de-
crease in liquidity provision by Intermediaries during this time period. However, the
relatively smaller decrease in the aggressive holdings change coeﬃcient compared to
that of HFTs may be due to the increase in aggressiveness of Intermediaries who sought
to oﬀset their disadvantageous positions during the Flash Crash.
28F. HFTs and Intermediaries: The Hot Potato Eﬀect
A basic characteristic of futures markets is that they remain in zero net supply through-
out the day. In other words, for each additional contract demanded, there is precisely
one additional contract supplied. End of day open interest presents a single reading of
the levels of supply and demand at the end of that day.
In intraday trading, changes in net demand/supply result from changes in net hold-
ings of diﬀerent traders within a speciﬁed period of time, e.g., one minute. These minute
by minute changes in the net positions of individual trading accounts can be aggregated
to get a minute by minute net change in holdings for our six trader categories. To
change their net position by one contract, a trader may buy one contract or may buy
101 contracts and sell 100 contracts.
We examine the ratio of trading volume during one minute intervals to the change in
net position over one second intervals to study the relationship between High Frequency
Trader trading volume and changes in net position. We calculate the same metric for
Intermediaries and ﬁnd that although High Frequency Traders are active before and
during the Flash Crash, they do not signiﬁcantly change their net positions.
Figure 8 presents the ratio of trading volume to net position change.
<Insert Figure 8>
We ﬁnd that compared to the three days prior to May 6, there was an unusually
level of HFT “hot potato” trading volume — due to repeated buying and selling of
contracts accompanied a relatively small change in net position. The hot potato eﬀect
was especially pronounced between 13:45:13 and 13:45:27 CT, when HFTs traded over
27,000 contracts, which accounted for approximately 49% of the total trading volume,
while their net position changed by only about 200 contracts.
29We interpret this ﬁnding as follows: the lack of Opportunistic and Fundamental
Traders, as well as Intermediaries, with whom HFTs typically trade just before the E-
mini price reached its trough, resulted in higher trading volume among HFTs, creating
a hot potato eﬀect. It is possible that during the period of high volatility, Opportunistic
and Fundamental Traders were either unable or unwilling to eﬃciently submit orders.
In the absence of their usual trading counterparties, HFTs were left to trade with other
HFTs.
VII. Fundamental Traders
Trading volume of the Fundamental Buyers and Sellers accounts for about 10-12% of
the total trading volume both during May 3-5 and on May 6. However, Fundamental
traders typically remove more liquidity from the market than they provide. As a result, a
sizable program executed by the Fundamental traders is more likely to have a signiﬁcant
impact on the market.
In this section we examine the trading behavior of Fundamental traders. We ask
the following question: Was the trading behavior of Fundamental Buyers and Sellers
diﬀerent on May 6, especially during the period of extreme price volatility?
Table VII presents the average number of contracts bought and sold by diﬀerent
categories of traders during two time periods on May 3-5 and on May 6. For both May
3-5 and May 6, the period between 1:32 p.m. and 1:45 p.m. CT is deﬁned as ‘UP’ and
the period between 1:45 p.m. and 2:08 p.m. CT is deﬁned as ‘DOWN’.
<Insert Table VII >
According to Table VII, there a signiﬁcant increase in the number of contracts sold by
30the Fundamental Sellers during the period of extreme price volatility on May 6 compared
to the same period during the previous three days.
Speciﬁcally, between 1:32 p.m. and 1:45 p.m. CT, the 13-minute period when the
prices rapidly declined, Fundamental Sellers sold more than 80,000 contracts net, while
Fundamental Buyers bought approximately 50,000 contracts net. This level of net selling
by the Fundamental Sellers is about 15 times larger compared to their net selling over
the same 13-minute interval on the previous three days, while the level of net buying by
the Fundamental Buyers is about 10 times larger compared to their net buying over the
same time period on the previous three days.
In contrast, between 1:45 p.m. and 2:08 p.m. CT, the 23-minute period of the
rapid price rebound, Fundamental Sellers sold more than 110,000 contracts net and
Fundamental Buyers bought more than 110,000 contracts net. This level of selling by
the Fundamental Sellers is about 10 times larger compared than their selling over the
same 23-minute interval on the previous three days, while this level of buying by the
Fundamental Buyers is more than 12 times larger compared to their buying over the
same time period on the previous three days.
In order to visualize the activity of Fundamental and Opportunistic Traders, we
calculate the change in net position of these traders during the time surrounding the
Flash Crash.
<Insert Figure 9 >
As the price of the E-mini contract decreased, there was also an imbalance in trading
activity between Fundamental Buyers and Sellers. Opportunistic Traders appear to
have picked up the excess selling pressure. The price of the E-mini contract recovered
as Fundamental Buyers entered the market.
31VIII. Opportunistic Traders
Opportunistic Traders comprise approximately a third of trading accounts active on
May 6. Accordingly, the trading behavior of Opportunistic Traders, especially during
the Flash Crash, warrants discussion. These trading accounts’ behavior diﬀers from that
of other trader categories.
A. Opportunistic Traders: Net Holdings
Opportunistic traders seem to exhibit mean reverting behavior similar to that of HFTs
and Intermediaries, but also establish large net positions like Fundamental Traders.
Figure 10 illustrates this point by presenting the net holdings of Opportunistic traders
on May 3-6.
<Insert Figure 10>
Opportunistic traders increased their net position by approximately 70,000 contracts
during the Flash Crash. This buying pressure came at an opportune time as prices had
already fallen signiﬁcantly.
B. Opportunistic Traders: Proﬁts and Losses
Figure 11 shows the proﬁts and losses of Opportunistic Traders on May 3-6.
<Insert Figure 11>
The buying activity of Opportunistic Traders during the Flash Crash could have
translated into substantial proﬁts as a large portion of their buying was during the
32price rebound. However, it is important to note the assumptions of this calculation.
We assume that traders begin the day with no preexisting position. Accordingly, the
massive swings in proﬁts and losses are a function of the large net position Opportunistic
Traders established during the Flash Crash.
IX. Aggressiveness Imbalance and Prices
We utilize the aggressiveness imbalance indicator to estimate the sensitivity of prices
to the aggressiveness imbalances of various trader categories. Aggressiveness Imbalance
is an indicator designed to capture the direction of the removal of liquidity from the
market. Aggressiveness Imbalance is constructed as the diﬀerence between aggressive
buy transactions minus aggressive sell transactions.
Figure 12 shows the relationship between price and cumulative Aggressiveness Im-
balance (aggressive buys - aggressive sells).
<Insert Figure 12>
In addition, we calculate aggressiveness imbalance for each category of traders over
one minute intervals. For illustrative purposes, the Aggressiveness Imbalance indicator
for HFTs and Intermediaries are presented in Figures 13 and 14, respectively.
<Insert Figure 13>
<Insert Figure 14>
33According, to Figures 13 and 14, visually, HFTs behave very diﬀerently during the
Flash Crash compared to the Intermediaries. HFTs aggressively sold on the way down
and aggressively bought on the way up. In contrast, Intermediaries are about equally
passive and aggressive both down and up.
More formally, we estimate sensitivity of prices to the aggressiveness imbalances of
diﬀerent categories of traders. The estimates are obtained by running the following
minute-by-minute regressions:
∆Pt
Pt 1  σt 1
= α +
5 ∑
i=1
[λi 
AGGi,t
Shri,t 1  100,000
] + ϵt (3)
The dependent variable in the regression is the price return scaled by the previous
period’s volatility.14 The independent variables in the regression are the aggressiveness
imbalance for each trader category scaled by the category’s lagged share of market
volume times 100,000. The Newey West (1987) estimator t is employed.
Estimated coeﬃcients are presented in Table VIII.
<Insert Table VIII >
Panel A of Table VIII presents regression results for the period May 3-5. The speci-
ﬁcation ﬁts quite well with an R2 of 36% and all estimated price sensitivity coeﬃcients
are statistically signiﬁcant at 5% level.
HFTs and Opportunistic traders have the largest coeﬃcients at 5.37 and 7.6, respec-
tively. The coeﬃcient of the Intermediaries is the lowest at 0.83. The coeﬃcient for
Fundamental Sellers (1.36) is about equal to that of the Fundamental Buyers (1.31).
Panel B of Table VIII presents regression results for May 6. The model seems to have
a better ﬁt with an R2 of 59%. All slope coeﬃcients are again statistically signiﬁcant
14For the estimate of volatility, we use range - the natural logarithm of the maximum price over the
minimum price.
34at 5% level. The coeﬃcient for HFTs is smaller at 3.23. In contrast, the coeﬃcients
of the Intermediaries (5.99) is more than seven times larger on May 6 compared to the
previous three days. The coeﬃcient of Opportunistic traders on May 6 (7.49) is about
the same as it is during May 3-5. However, the coeﬃcient of Fundamental Sellers (0.53)
is nearly double that of the Fundamental Buyers (0.53).
We interpret these results as follows. High Frequency Traders have a large, positive
coeﬃcient possibly due to their ability to anticipate price changes. In contrast, Fun-
damental Traders have much smaller coeﬃcients, which is likely due to their explicit
trading strategies that try to limit market impact, in order to minimize transaction
costs.
To illustrate the ﬁt of these regressions, we use the estimated coeﬃcients from the ag-
gressiveness imbalance regression during May 3-5 to ﬁt minute-by-minute price changes
on May 6 (Figure 15).
<Insert Figure 15>
According to Figure 15, the ﬁtted price (marked line) is quite close to the actual
price (solid line).
X. Discussion: The Flash Crash
We believe that the events on May 6 unfolded as follows. Financial markets, already
tense over concerns about the European sovereign debt crisis, opened to news concerning
the Greek government’s ability to service its sovereign debt. As a result, premiums
rose for buying protection against default on sovereign debt securities of Greece and a
number of other European countries. In addition, the S&P 500 volatility index (“VIX”)
35increased, and yields of ten-year Treasuries fell as investors engaged in a “ﬂight to
quality.” By mid-afternoon, the Dow Jones Industrial Average was down about 2.5%.
Sometime after 2:30 p.m., Fundamental Sellers began executing a large sell program.
Typically, such a large sell program would not be executed at once, but rather spread
out over time, perhaps over hours. The magnitude of the Fundamental Sellers’ trading
program began to signiﬁcantly outweigh the ability of Fundamental Buyers to absorb
the selling pressure.
HFTs and Intermediaries were the likely buyers of the initial batch of sell orders
from Fundamental Sellers, thus accumulating temporary long positions. Thus, during
the early moments of this sell program’s execution, HFTs and Intermediaries provided
liquidity to this sell order.
However, just like market intermediaries in the days of ﬂoor trading, HFTs and
Intermediaries had no desire to hold their positions over a long time horizon. A few
minutes after they bought the ﬁrst batch of contracts sold by Fundamental Sellers, HFTs
aggressively sold contracts to reduce their inventories. As they sold contracts, HFTs
were no longer providers of liquidity to the selling program. In fact, HFTs competed for
liquidity with the selling program, further amplifying the price impact of this program.
Furthermore, total trading volume and trading volume of HFTs increased signiﬁ-
cantly minutes before and during the Flash Crash. Finally, as the price of the E-mini
rapidly fell and many traders were unwilling or unable to submit orders, HFTs repeatedly
bought and sold from one another, generating a “hot-potato” eﬀect.
Yet, Fundamental Buyers, who may have realized signiﬁcant proﬁts from this large
decrease in price, did not seem to be willing or able to provide ample buy-side liquidity.
As a result, between 2:45:13 and 2:45:27, prices of the E-mini fell about 1.7%.
At 2:45:28, a 5 second trading pause was automatically activated in the E-mini.
Opportunistic and Fundamental Buyers aggressively executed trades which led to a
36rapid recovery in prices. HFTs continued their strategy of rapidly buying and selling
contracts, while about half of the Intermediaries closed their positions and got out of
the market.
In light of these events, a few fundamental questions arise. Why did it take so long
for Fundamental Buyers to enter the market and why did the price concessions had
to be so large? It seems possible that some Fundamental Buyers could not distinguish
between macroeconomic fundamentals and market-speciﬁc liquidity events. It also seems
possible that the opportunistic buyers have already accumulated a signiﬁcant positive
inventory earlier in the day as prices were steadily declining. Furthermore, it is possible
that they could not quickly ﬁnd opportunities to hedge additional positive inventory
in other markets which also experienced signiﬁcant volatility and higher latencies. An
examination of these hypotheses requires data from all venues, products, and traders on
the day of the Flash Crash.
XI. Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the behavior of High Frequency Traders and other categories
of traders during the extremely volatile environment on May 6, 2010.
Based on our analysis, we believe that High Frequency Traders exhibit trading pat-
terns inconsistent with the traditional deﬁnition of market making. Speciﬁcally, High
Frequency Traders aggressively trade in the direction of price changes. This activity
comprises a large percentage of total trading volume, but does not result in a signiﬁcant
accumulation of inventory. As a result, whether under normal market conditions or
during periods of high volatility, High Frequency Traders are not willing to accumulate
large positions or absorb large losses. Moreover, their contribution to higher trading
volumes may be mistaken for liquidity by Fundamental Traders. Finally, when rebal-
37ancing their positions, High Frequency Traders may compete for liquidity and amplify
price volatility.
Consequently, we believe, that irrespective of technology, markets can become frag-
ile when imbalances arise as a result of large traders seeking to buy or sell quantities
larger than intermediaries are willing to temporarily hold, and simultaneously long-term
suppliers of liquidity are not forthcoming even if signiﬁcant price concessions are oﬀered.
We believe that technological innovation is critical for market development. However,
as markets change, appropriate safeguards must be implemented to keep pace with
trading practices enabled by advances in technology.
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41Table I: Market Descriptive Statistics
May 3-5 May 6th
Volume 2,397,639 5,094,703
# of Trades 446,340 1,030,204
# of Traders 11,875 15,422
Trade Size 5.41 4.99
Order Size 10.83 9.76
Limit Orders % Volume 95.45% 92.44%
Limit Orders % Trades 94.36% 91.75%
Volatility 1.54% 9.82%
Return -0.02% -3.05%
This table presents summary statistics for the June
2010 E-Mini S&P 500 futures contract. The ﬁrst
column presents averages calculated for May 3-5,
2010 between 8:30 and 15:15 CT. The second column
presents statistics for May 6t, 2010 between 8:30 to
15:15 CT. Volume is the number of contracts traded.
The number of traders is the number of trading ac-
counts that traded at least once during a trading day.
Order size and trade sizes are measured in the number
of contracts. The use of limit orders is presented both
in percent of the number of transactions and trading
volume. Volatility is calculated as range, the natu-
ral logarithm of maximum price over minimum price
within a trading day.
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44Table IV: HFTs and Intermediaries: Net Holdings and Prices
Panel A: May 3-5 Panel B: May 6
∆ NP HFT ∆ NP INT ∆ NP HFT ∆ NP INT
Intercept -1.637 -0.529 Intercept -3.222 0.038
(-3.758) (-3.632) (-3.429) (0.138)
∆NPHFTt 1 -0.006 ∆NPHFTt 1 0.011
(-0.735) (1.248)
NPHFTt 1 -0.005 NPHFTt 1 -0.005
(-11.505) (-7.229)
∆NPINTt 1 -0.006 ∆NPINTt 1 -0.035
(-0.673) (-2.570)
NPINTt 1 -0.004 NPINTt 1 -0.008
(-10.043) (-8.426)
∆Pt 32.089 -13.540 ∆Pt 10.808 -8.164
(18.380) (-21.992) (5.142) (-7.274)
∆Pt 1 17.178 -1.218 ∆Pt 1 4.625 6.635
(12.983) (-2.708) (3.639) (9.784)
∆Pt 2 8.357 2.160 ∆Pt 2 -1.520 2.734
(7.376) (5.107) (-1.384) (4.433)
∆Pt 3 5.086 2.525 ∆Pt 3 -1.360 1.138
(4.998) (6.013) (-0.978) (3.031)
∆Pt 4 3.909 2.654 ∆Pt 4 -1.815 0.487
(3.656) (6.583) (-1.680) (1.270)
∆Pt 5 1.807 2.499 ∆Pt 5 -0.228 -0.768
(1.578) (5.898) (-1.680) (-1.857)
∆Pt 6 -0.078 2.163 ∆Pt 6 -0.312 -0.312
(-0.072) (5.448) (-0.223) (-0.826)
∆Pt 7 -1.002 1.842 ∆Pt 7 -5.037 -0.617
(-0.975) (4.969) (-3.555) (-1.257)
∆Pt 8 -1.756 1.466 ∆Pt 8 -1.775 -0.359
(-1.535) (3.901) (-1.319) (-1.044)
∆Pt 9 -1.811 0.453 ∆Pt 9 -1.678 -1.105
(-1.672) (1.252) (-1.432) (-2.736)
∆Pt 10 -3.899 0.525 ∆Pt 10 -1.654 -0.387
(-3.795) (1.366) (-1.188) (-0.936)
∆Pt 11 -4.728 -0.026 ∆Pt 11 -1.076 -0.628
(-4.752) (-0.071) (-0.903) (-1.221)
∆Pt 12 -3.456 0.152 ∆Pt 12 0.706 -1.171
(-3.321) (0.431) (0.477) (-2.163)
∆Pt 13 -3.799 0.267 ∆Pt 13 2.261 -0.617
(-3.772) (0.738) (1.354) (-1.457)
∆Pt 14 -4.769 0.317 ∆Pt 14 -2.664 -0.270
(-4.708) (0.822) (-2.346) (-0.735)
∆Pt 15 -2.735 -0.195 ∆Pt 15 0.428 -0.833
(-2.613) (-0.544) (0.330) (-2.442)
∆Pt 16 -2.208 -0.642 ∆Pt 16 -0.683 0.227
(-2.123) (-1.830) (-0.385) (0.638)
∆Pt 17 -2.517 -0.100 ∆Pt 17 -0.657 0.293
(-2.522) (-0.261) (-0.469) (0.783)
∆Pt 18 -4.358 0.044 ∆Pt 18 0.446 -0.769
(-3.989) (0.117) (0.264) (-2.124)
∆Pt 19 -4.215 0.568 ∆Pt 19 -2.629 -0.296
(-4.090) (1.530) (-2.072) (-0.793)
∆Pt 20 -5.860 -0.120 ∆Pt 20 -1.073 -0.706
(-5.987) (-0.343) (-0.781) (-1.576)
#obs 72837 72837 #obs 24275 24275
Adj   R2 0.0194 0.0263 Adj   R2 0.0101 0.0390
This table displays estimated coeﬃcients of the following regression: ∆yt = α + ϕ∆yt 1 +
δyt 1 +
∑20
i=0[βt i  ∆pt i/0.25] + ϵt. The dependent variable is changes in holdings of
High Frequency Traders and Intermediaries, respectively. Both changes in holdings, ∆yt,
and lagged holdings, yt   1, are in the number of contracts. Price changes, ∆pt   i, are
in ticks. Estimates are computed for second-by-second observations. The t statistics are
calculated using the Newey-West (1987) estimator. t values reported in parentheses are in
bold if the coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
45Table V: HFTs and Intermediaries: Liquidity Provision/Removal
Panel A: May 3-5 Panel B: May 6
∆ A HFT ∆ P HFT ∆ A INT ∆ P INT ∆ A HFT ∆ P HFT ∆ A INT ∆ P INT
Intercept -1.285 -0.352 -0.344 -0.185 -2.863 -0.359 -0.246 0.284
(-2.855) (-1.291) (-3.040) (-1.515) (-3.242) (-0.670) (-1.277) (1.212)
∆NPHFTt 1 -0.042 0.036 -0.003 0.014
(-4.931) (6.805) (-0.286) (1.770)
NPHFTt 1 -0.005 -0.001 -0.004 -0.001
(-9.619) (-3.204) (-5.701) (-2.924)
∆NPINTt 1 0.007 -0.013 -0.003 -0.032
(1.623) (-1.683) (-0.531) (-2.557)
NPINTt 1 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004
(-6.150) (-6.182) (-4.540) (-4.824)
∆Pt 57.778 -25.689 6.377 -19.917 23.703 -12.895 4.939 -13.103
(29.925) (-28.850) (17.751) (-32.937) (7.411) (-5.281) (7.807) (-8.502)
∆Pt 1 22.549 -5.371 5.791 -7.009 -1.118 5.744 3.909 2.726
(16.181) (-7.829) (17.521) (-18.574) (-0.946) (4.171) (9.102) (5.343)
∆Pt 2 9.614 -1.258 4.752 -2.592 -2.661 1.141 1.659 1.075
(8.089) (-1.826) (15.125) (-7.739) (-2.613) (1.101) (5.187) (2.279)
∆Pt 3 5.442 -0.356 3.642 -1.117 -1.151 -0.209 0.536 0.602
(5.142) (-0.586) (12.586) (-3.383) (-0.890) (-0.175) (2.288) (1.675)
∆Pt 4 3.290 0.619 3.114 -0.460 -2.814 0.999 0.229 0.258
(2.937) (0.949) (10.888) (-1.366) (-2.739) (0.994) (1.004) (0.690)
∆Pt 5 1.926 -0.119 2.591 -0.092 -0.690 0.461 0.161 -0.929
(1.664) (-0.170) (8.656) (-0.266) (-0.556) (0.489) (0.546) (-1.822)
∆Pt 6 -0.987 0.909 2.038 0.125 -1.824 1.512 0.053 -0.365
(-0.872) (1.374) (7.017) (0.373) (-1.475) (1.344) (0.210) (-1.058)
∆Pt 7 -0.291 -0.711 2.101 -0.258 -2.688 -2.350 -0.516 -0.102
(-0.257) (-1.065) (8.333) (-0.812) (-2.295) (-1.754) (-2.345) (-0.244)
∆Pt 8 -0.977 -0.779 1.740 -0.274 -2.216 0.441 -0.625 0.267
(-0.797) (-1.159) (6.540) (-0.850) (-1.910) (0.394) (-2.668) (0.815)
∆Pt 9 -0.732 -1.078 1.158 -0.705 -0.801 -0.877 -0.099 -1.007
(-0.643) (-1.697) (4.541) (-2.259) (-0.732) (-0.896) (-0.364) (-2.525)
∆Pt 10 -2.543 -1.356 1.007 -0.483 -2.958 1.304 -0.513 0.125
(-2.370) (-2.246) (3.858) (-1.538) (-2.519) (1.253) (-1.949) (0.291)
∆Pt 11 -3.536 -1.193 0.425 -0.451 -1.099 0.023 -0.867 0.239
(-3.356) (-1.963) (1.612) (-1.463) (-1.090) (0.024) (-3.152) (0.509)
∆Pt 12 -2.523 -0.934 0.207 -0.054 0.974 -0.268 -0.396 -0.775
(-2.328) (-1.436) (0.781) (-0.178) (0.878) (-0.203) (-1.514) (-1.532)
∆Pt 13 -2.130 -1.669 0.502 -0.235 1.169 1.093 -0.293 -0.324
(-2.040) (-2.712) (1.868) (-0.786) (0.904) (0.716) (-1.181) (-0.838)
∆Pt 14 -4.387 -0.382 0.107 0.210 -1.249 -1.415 -0.450 0.180
(-4.154) (-0.631) (0.396) (0.630) (-1.223) (-1.253) (-1.892) (0.522)
∆Pt 15 -1.965 -0.770 0.099 -0.294 1.006 -0.579 -0.535 -0.298
(-1.834) (-1.231) (0.368) (-0.934) (0.922) (-0.638) (-2.153) (-0.857)
∆Pt 16 -2.434 0.226 -0.182 -0.460 -1.300 0.617 0.215 0.012
(-2.190) (0.391) (-0.673) (-1.528) (-1.028) (0.560) (0.859) (0.037)
∆Pt 17 -2.185 -0.332 0.238 -0.338 -1.707 1.051 -0.239 0.532
(-2.019) (-0.545) (0.884) (-1.066) (-1.521) (0.948) (-0.957) (1.595)
∆Pt 18 -3.259 -1.099 0.311 -0.267 0.482 -0.036 0.051 -0.820
(-2.862) (-1.739) (1.255) (-0.824) (0.440) (-0.035) (0.229) (-2.537)
∆Pt 19 -3.585 -0.631 0.544 0.024 -0.746 -1.883 -0.265 -0.0311
(-3.297) (-1.014) (2.085) (0.077) (-0.761) (-1.542) (-1.070) (-0.0782)
∆Pt 20 -4.621 -1.240 0.211 -0.331 -0.535 -0.538 -0.501 -0.205
(-4.493) (-2.144) (0.863) (-1.114) (-0.521) (-0.570) (-2.276) (-0.484)
#obs 72837 72837 72837 72837 24275 24275 24275 24275
Adj   R2 0.0427 0.0260 0.0202 0.0631 0.0252 0.0270 0.0457 0.0698
This table presents estimated coeﬃcients of the following regression: ∆yt = α + ϕ∆yt 1 +
δyt 1 +
∑20
i=0[βt i  ∆pt i/0.25] + ϵt. Dependent variables are changes in Aggressive and
Passive holdings of High Frequency Traders and Intermediaries. Changes in holdings, ∆yt,
and lagged holdings, yt   1, are in the number of contracts. Price changes, ∆pt   i, are
in ticks. Estimates are computed for second-by-second observations. The t statistics are
calculated using the Newey-West (1987) estimator. t values reported in parentheses are in
bold if the coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
46Table VI: Aggressive and Passive Holdings: Flash Crash
Panel A: Down Panel B: Up
∆ A HFT ∆ P HFT ∆ A INT ∆ P INT ∆ A HFT ∆ P HFT ∆ A INT ∆ P INT
Intercept -0.614 7.792 -1.320 9.992 2.111 -1.880 1.484 -1.477
(-0.080) (2.306) (-0.440) (3.291) (0.676) (-0.647) (1.319) (-1.837)
∆NPHFTt 1 -0.023 -0.014 0.025 -0.026
(-0.748) (-0.744) (0.996) (-1.130)
NPHFTt 1 -0.008 0.0010 -0.005 -0.001
(-1.947) (0.370) (-2.258) (-0.336)
∆NPINTt 1 -0.043 -0.005 0.053 0.008
(-1.585) (-0.133) (2.563) (0.426)
NPINTt 1 -0.0003 -0.012 -0.004 -0.0009
(-0.079) (-2.812) (-2.366) (-0.654)
∆Pt 24.226 8.533 8.251 -9.603 -0.251 -9.107 2.912 -4.105
(2.833) (1.275) (3.864) (-2.618) (-0.142) (-4.378) (4.257) (-6.296)
∆Pt 1 2.397 9.540 8.821 2.075 -0.993 6.350 2.150 2.934
(0.557) (1.710) (6.132) (0.977) (-0.621) (2.773) (4.446) (5.790)
∆Pt 2 -4.273 3.669 4.257 0.298 -3.043 -0.445 0.402 0.457
(-0.915) (0.839) (2.307) (0.214) (-1.937) (-0.222) (1.039) (0.893)
∆Pt 3 -2.891 1.747 0.759 -0.138 0.814 -1.763 -0.099 0.283
(-0.681) (0.569) (0.865) (-0.130) (0.392) (-0.686) (-0.330) (0.610)
∆Pt 4 -2.040 -5.780 -2.175 0.009 -2.391 3.192 0.109 0.128
(-0.510) (-2.053) (-2.012) (0.007) (-1.769) (2.022) (0.386) (0.316)
∆Pt 5 -4.990 -5.326 0.070 -1.314 0.586 1.898 0.007 -0.657
(-1.046) (-0.911) (0.060) (-1.302) (0.403) (1.088) (0.019) (-1.350)
∆Pt 6 -7.924 6.621 -1.187 0.266 -0.426 2.800 0.282 -0.749
(-1.847) (1.994) (-1.206) (0.228) (-0.345) (1.515) (0.873) (-1.676)
∆Pt 7 6.843 -11.357 0.597 -1.384 -4.091 -3.299 -0.708 -0.753
(1.651) (-2.454) (0.640) (-1.266) (-2.690) (-1.401) (-2.157) (-1.605)
∆Pt 8 -6.903 6.837 -2.720 1.184 -0.049 -0.676 -0.401 0.183
(-1.542) (1.562) (-2.498) (0.892) (-0.032) (-0.365) (-1.205) (0.529)
∆Pt 9 0.624 -7.531 -1.732 -0.761 0.219 -0.115 -0.444 -0.709
(0.128) (-1.623) (-1.385) (-0.646) (0.189) (-0.082) (-1.244) (-1.899)
∆Pt 10 2.024 -3.278 -2.189 -0.300 -1.380 0.609 -0.299 -0.302
(0.324) (-0.583) (-1.611) (-0.194) (-0.920) (0.291) (-0.962) (-0.778)
∆Pt 11 0.412 4.367 -5.216 -1.190 -0.157 1.102 -0.607 0.200
(0.068) (1.076) (-4.948) (-0.739) (-0.135) (0.607) (-1.593) (0.449)
∆Pt 12 1.442 2.883 -2.684 1.850 0.700 -0.379 0.092 -0.986
(0.220) (0.577) (-1.984) (1.479) (0.527) (-0.163) (0.288) (-2.480)
∆Pt 13 17.340 -9.284 -0.385 -4.370 2.551 3.614 -0.212 0.429
(3.049) (-1.613) (-0.221) (-2.344) (1.351) (1.418) (-0.643) (1.027)
∆Pt 14 -11.389 -1.530 -1.904 2.974 0.378 -3.094 0.036 -0.349
(-2.531) (-0.226) (-1.627) (1.775) (0.304) (-1.571) (0.108) (-1.080)
∆Pt 15 8.706 -2.304 -4.375 -1.206 1.317 -1.904 -0.297 0.043
(1.281) (-0.332) (-4.377) (-0.783) (0.862) (-1.287) (-0.791) (0.100)
∆Pt 16 -3.908 -1.352 2.906 0.625 -1.480 0.541 0.372 0.234
(-0.642) (-0.229) (2.064) (0.369) (-0.903) (0.261) (1.036) (0.682)
∆Pt 17 6.351 -2.788 -0.147 -1.420 0.765 1.750 -0.241 0.725
(1.055) (-0.652) (-0.096) (-0.915) (0.505) (0.921) (-0.589) (1.792)
∆Pt 18 -8.521 -3.988 0.475 0.578 0.675 2.813 0.084 -0.584
(-1.642) (-0.647) (0.375) (0.356) (0.452) (1.533) (0.252) (-1.695)
∆Pt 19 6.899 -11.448 1.279 -3.649 -1.076 -3.171 -0.098 -0.086
(0.990) (-2.068) (0.936) (-1.830) (-0.835) (-1.773) (-0.300) (-0.195)
∆Pt 20 -14.611 6.997 -1.574 4.375 0.945 -1.366 -0.488 0.102
(-3.011) (1.226) (-1.404) (2.650) (0.678) (-0.922) (-1.486) (0.194)
#obs 808 808 808 808 1347 1347 1347 1347
Adj   R2 0.0423 0.0593 0.1779 0.0739 0.0084 0.0583 0.0655 0.0816
This table displays the results of the regression of ∆yt = α+ϕ∆yt 1+δyt 1+
∑20
i=0[βt i∆pt i/0.25]+ϵt
over one second intervals. The dependent variables are aggressive and passive holdings changes of High
Frequency Traders and Intermediaries. Changes in holdings (∆yt) and lagged holdings(yt   1) are deﬁned
in contracts. The price changes (∆pt   i) are deﬁned in ticks. DOWN period is deﬁned as the interval
between 13:32:00 (CT) and 13:45:28 (CT). UP period is deﬁned as the interval between 13:45:33 (CT) and
14:08:00 (CT). The t statistics are calculated using the Newey-West (1987) estimator. t values reported in
parentheses are in bold if the coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant at 5% level.
47Table VII: Trading Volume During the Flash Crash
Panel A: May 3-5
DOWN UP
Sell Buy Sell Buy
High Frequency Traders 23,746 23,791 40,524 40,021
Intermediaries 6,484 6,328 11,469 11,468
Fundamental Buyers 3,064 7,958 6,127 14,910
Fundamental Sellers 8,428 3,118 15,855 5,282
Opportunistic Traders 20,049 20,552 37,317 39,535
Small Traders 232 256 428 504
Panel B: May 6th
DOWN UP
Sell Buy Sell Buy
High Frequency Traders 152,436 153,804 191,490 189,013
Intermediaries 32,489 33,694 47,348 45,782
Fundamental Buyers 28,694 78,359 55,243 165,612
Fundamental Sellers 94,101 10,502 145,396 35,219
Opportunistic Traders 189,790 221,236 302,417 306,326
Small Traders 1,032 947 1,531 1,473
This table presents the number of contracts sold and bought by trader categories during DOWN
and UP periods. DOWN period is deﬁned as the interval between 13:32:00 and 13:45:28 CT. UP
period is deﬁned as the interval between 13:45:33 and 14:08:00 CT. Panel A reports the average
number of contracts bought and sold between May 3 and May 5, 2010 during the DOWN and
UP periods in the day. Panel B reports the number of contracts bought and sold on May 6,
2010 during the DOWN and UP periods.
48Table VIII: Aggressiveness Imbalance and Prices
May 3-5 May 6
Intercept -0.01 0.01
(-0.19) (0.31)
High Frequency Traders 5.37 3.23
(6.43) (3.37)
Intermediaries 0.83 5.99
(1.08) (5.08)
Fundamental Buyers 1.31 0.53
(4.32) (2.20)
Fundamental Sellers 1.36 0.92
(5.81) (6.40)
Opportunistic Traders 7.60 7.49
(9.74) (10.61)
# of Obs 1210 404
Adj-R2 0.36 0.59
This table presents estimated coeﬃcients of the following regression: ∆Pt
Pt 1σt 1 = α +
∑5
i=1[λi 
AGGi;t
Shri;t 1100,000] + ϵt. The dependent variable is the return scaled by volatility
over one minute interval. Independent variables are the aggressiveness imbalances of
trader categories scaled by their market share times 100,000. t-values are corrected for
serial correlation, up to three lags, using the Newey-West (1987) estimator. t-values,
reported in parentheses, are in bold if the coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant at the
5% level.
49Figure 1: U. S. Equity Indices on May 6, 2010
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This ﬁgure presents end-of-minute transaction prices of the Dow Jones Industrial Average
(DJIA), S&P 500 Index, and the June 2010 E-Mini S&P 500 futures contract on May 6, 2010
between 8:30 and 15:15 CT.
50Figure 2: Prices and Trading Volume of the E-Mini S&P 500 Stock Index Futures
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This ﬁgure presents minute-by-minute transaction prices and trading volume of the June
2010 E-Mini S&P futures contract on May 6, 2010 between 8:30 and 15:15 CT. Trading
volume is calculated as the number of contracts traded during each minute. Transaction
price is the last transaction price of each minute.
51Figure 3: Trading Accounts Trading Volume and Net Position Scaled by Market Trading
Volume
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This ﬁgure presents trader categories superimposed (as shaded areas) over all individual trading
accounts ranked by their trading volume and net position scaled by market trading volume. The
ﬁgures reﬂect trading activity in the June 2010 E-Mini S&P 500 futures contract for May 3-6,
2010.
52Figure 4: Net Position of High Frequency Traders
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This ﬁgure presents the net position of High Frequency Traders (left vertical axis) and
transaction prices (right vertical axis) in the June 2010 E-Mini S&P 500 futures contract
over one minute intervals during May 3, 4 , 5, and 6 between 8:30 to 15:15 CT. Net
position is calculated as the diﬀerence between total open long and total open short
positions of High Frequency Traders at the end of each minute. Transaction price is the
last transaction price of each minute.
53Figure 5: Net Position of Intermediaries
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This ﬁgure presents the net position of Intermediaries (left vertical axis) and transaction
prices (right vertical axis) in the June 2010 E-Mini S&P 500 futures contract over one
minute intervals during May 3, 4, 5, and 6 between 8:30 to 15:15 CT. Net position is
calculated as the diﬀerence between total open long and total open short positions of
Intermediaries at the end of each minute. Transaction price is the last transaction price
of each minute.
54Figure 6: Proﬁts and Losses of High Frequency Traders
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This ﬁgure presents the proﬁts and losses of High Frequency Traders (left vertical axis)in
the June 2010 E-Mini S&P 500 futures contract reported over one minute intervals dur-
ing May 3, 4, 5, and 6 between 8:30 to 15:15 CT. Proﬁts and losses are calculated by
multiplying lagged net position by the change in price.
55Figure 7: Proﬁts and Losses of Intermediaries
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This ﬁgure presents the proﬁts and losses of Intermediaries (left vertical axis)in the June
2010 E-Mini S&P 500 futures contract reported over one minute intervals during May 3,
4, 5, and 6 between 8:30 to 15:15 CT. Proﬁts and losses are calculated by multiplying
lagged net position by the change in price.
56Figure 8: Hot Potato Volume
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This ﬁgure shows the price and the scaled trading volume by HFTs and
Intermediaries over one second intervals. Scaled trading volume is calculated
as the 5 second moving average of contracts traded over absolute value net
holdings. Price reﬂects the last transaction price during an interval. Prices
and scaled trading volumes are reported from 13:44 to 13:46 CT.
57Figure 9: Change in Net Position of Fundamental and Opportunistic Traders
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This ﬁgure presents the change in net position of Fundamental and Opportunistic Traders
(left vertical axis) and transaction prices (right vertical axis) in the June 2010 E-Mini S&P
500 futures contract over one minute intervals on 6 between 13:19 to 14:09 CT. Net position
is calculated as the diﬀerence between total open long and total open short positions of
Opportunistic Traders at the end of each minute. Transaction price is the last transaction
price of each minute.
58Figure 10: Net Position of Opportunistic Traders
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This ﬁgure presents the net position of Opportunistic Traders (left vertical axis) and
transaction prices (right vertical axis) in the June 2010 E-Mini S&P 500 futures contract
over one minute intervals during May 3, 4, 5, and 6 between 8:30 to 15:15 CT. Net position
is calculated as the diﬀerence between total open long and total open short positions of
Opportunistic Traders at the end of each minute. Transaction price is the last transaction
price of each minute.
59Figure 11: Proﬁts and Losses of Opportunistic Traders
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This ﬁgure presents the proﬁts and losses of Opportunistic Traders (left vertical axis)in the
June 2010 E-Mini S&P 500 futures contract reported over one minute intervals during May
3, 4, 5, and 6 between 8:30 to 15:15 CT. Proﬁts and Losses are calculated by multiplying
the lagged net position by the change in price.
60Figure 12: Total Aggressiveness Imbalance
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This ﬁgure presents the total aggressiveness imbalance and prices in the June 2010 E-
Mini S&P 500 futures contract over one minute intervals between 8:30 to 15:15 CT on
May 6, 2010. Aggressiveness Imbalance is calculated as cumulative total aggressive Buy
transactions minus cumulative total aggressive Sell transactions at the end of each minute.
Price is the last transaction price for each minute.
61Figure 13: Aggressiveness Imbalance of High Frequency Traders
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This ﬁgure presents the Aggressiveness Imbalance of High Frequency Traders (HFTs)
and prices in the June 2010 E-Mini S&P 500 futures contract over one minute intervals
between 8:30 to 15:15 CT on May 6, 2010. Aggressiveness Imbalance of HFTs is calculated
as cumulative HFT aggressive Buy transactions minus cumulative HFT aggressive Sell
transactions at the end of each minute. Price is the last transaction price for each minute.
62Figure 14: Aggressiveness Imbalance of Intermediaries
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This ﬁgure presents the Aggressiveness Imbalance of Intermediaries and prices in the
June 2010 E-Mini S&P 500 futures contract over one minute intervals between 8:30 to
15:15 CT on May 6, 2010. Aggressiveness Imbalance of Intermediaries is calculated as
cumulative aggressive Buy transactions of Intermediaries minus cumulative aggressive Sell
transactions of Intermediaries at the end of each minute. Price is the last transaction price
for each minute.
63Figure 15: Fitted Price Based on Aggressiveness Imbalance
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This ﬁgure presents actual and ﬁtted prices in the June 2010 E-Mini S&P 500
futures contract over one minute intervals between 8:30 to 15:15 CT on May
6, 2010. The Solid line is the last actual transaction price for each minute.
The Marked line is the ﬁtted price calculated by applying estimated coef-
ﬁcients from the aggressiveness imbalance regressions (Equation (3)) using
data for May 3-5, 2010 to realized Aggressive Imbalances of diﬀerent trader
categories on May 6, 2010.
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